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ABSTRACT
We analyse the determinants of success for 630 ICOs undertaken
from August 2015 up until the end of December 2017, a period in
which the market for ICOs grew to an unprecented level. We find
evidence that ICOs are more successful in raising funding when
they disclose more information to investors (i.e. have a higher
profile rating), have a higher quality rating by cryptocurrency
experts, have a pre-ICO GitHub repository, organise a presale,
refrain from offering bonus schemes, have shorter planned token
sale durations and have a larger project team. ICOs that disclose
more information to investors and that have a higher quality rating
at the time of the campaign show stronger ex-post performance.
Longer-term project success is positively impacted by having a pre-
ICO GitHub repository, a shorter planned token sale duration and
having a larger project team at the time of the ICO, although these
results depend on the ex-post success measure used. We conclude
that for entrepreneurs it is important to make an ICO as transparent
as possible and that profile and expert ratings are a valuable means
to overcome the information asymmetry problems associated with
token sales.
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1. Introduction
Initial Coin Offerings (ICOs) have become an increasingly popular way to raise capital for
blockchain technology startups. In an ICO, entrepreneurs raise money for their venture by
selling newly created cryptocurrency tokens to investors in exchange for fiat currency
such as US dollars or cryptocurrencies such as Ethereum or Bitcoin (Chohan 2020;
Kastelein 2017). At the time of the ICO, the project is mostly at the idea stage and the
actual launch of the product or service is expected within one to two years after the ICO
(EY 2017). The cryptocurrency tokens typically act as a digital medium of exchange to
access the firm’s digital platform and services. After completing the ICO, the tokens may
be traded on an online exchange and increase in value with the success of the project.
One advantage for entrepreneurs is that ICOs allow them to raise capital by selling tokens
rather than shares and therefore do not require them to give up ownership and control
rights to investors as would be the case with venture capital or equity-based crowdfund-
ing (Schwienbacher 2019).
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The total amount of funding through ICOs in 2017 equalled 5.38 USD billion, surpass-
ing early-stage venture capital investments in blockchain startups (Sunnarborg 2017) and
12 USD billion in the 16 months since January 2017 (Benedetti and Kostovetsky 2018).
Some blockchain startups have been able to raise capital via token sales at record speed,
largely because of investors’ fear of missing out (referred to as FOMO). For example, the
company Gnosis was able to raise 12 USD million in less than 10 minutes (Cointelegraph
2017). At the same time, the number of blockchain startups reaching their maximum
fundraising goal has declined since the last quarter of 2017 and regulators are pointing
out the risks associated with largely unregulated ICOs such as fraud, exaggeration of
expected returns and lack of transparency (EY 2017; SEC 2017).
In their review of new developments in venture capital funding, Harrison and Mason
(2019) mention ICOs to be the most recent player in the market for risk capital. They
discuss the growth of the market and mention four important elements of ICOs, i.e. (i)
reduction in the cost of capital, (ii) open-source product development, (iii) peer-to-peer
platforms, and (iv) the creation of secondary markets. Harrison and Mason (2019) also
mention the collapse of the market in the third quarter of 2018 as an indication that the
rise of ICOs may have been a bubble. However, they argue that ICOs cannot be marked as
a scam and that, with appropriate regulation, ICOs can become a viable disruptive
technology, representing a fertile avenue for further research.
In this paper, we aim to understand the determinants of both funding and ex-post
success of ICOs launched in the period before the collapse of the market. In the first part of
our analysis, we focus on funding success and question why some projects succeed in
raising funding in ICOs and get their tokens listed on CoinMarketCap, a leading website
for tracking exchange-traded cryptocurrencies, whereas others do not.1 Our sample
includes both uncapped and capped ICOs. In an uncapped ICO, the token supply is not
limited or the token price is not known beforehand. This contrasts with the vast majority
of capped ICOs in which the company sells a limited supply of tokens at a fixed price. In
a capped ICO the company may set two funding goals: a minimum fundraising goal
(softcap) as well as a maximum fundraising goal (hardcap). The company only keeps the
money it has raised in case the amount raised exceeds the pre-set softcap (“all-or-
nothing”). Once the softcap has been reached the company keeps all the money it raises
even if the hardcap has not been reached (“keep–it-all”). In our analyses, we use several
dependent variables to measure funding success in order to reflect the different ways
ICOs can be structured: a binary variable indicating whether the ICO reaches its softcap (if
any), the amount of money raised as a percentage of the hardcap (only in capped ICOs),
the log of the amount of money raised in the ICO, and a binary variable indicating
whether the ICO is listed on CoinMarketCap. In our analysis, we focus on the period in
which the ICO market grew to unprecedented volume because we are interested in
understanding the mechanics of the build-up of this new market. We employ a large
sample of 630 capped and uncapped ICOs from August 2015 until December 2017.
In the second part of our analysis, we look beyond funding success and also investigate
whether the project is successful afterwards or has ended up on what Varshneya (2018)
calls the “digital graveyard”. We focus on 472 projects that successfully raised money and
investigate whether these projects have survived up to November 2019. We use five
measures of ex-post success: whether the project’s website is still online in
November 2019, the number of Tweets per week since the ICO commenced, whether
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the project has recently been active on Twitter, whether the project has recently updated
its repositories on the software development platform GitHub, and whether the ICO
ended up on the digital graveyard or not in November 2019 (i.e., traded below 10% of
its original ICO price or was no longer tracked on CoinMarketCap).
Our results show that ICOs with a higher profile and expert rating are more successful
in raising funds and perform better ex-post. We find evidence that having a pre-ICO
GitHub repository, organising a presale for early investors, a shorter planned token sale
duration, not having a bonus scheme, and having a larger project team is positively
associated to fundraising success. Longer-term project success is positively impacted by
having a pre-ICO GitHub repository, a shorter planned token sale duration and having
a larger project team at the time of the ICO, although results depend on the ex-post
success measure used.
Our paper adds to the literature on entrepreneurial finance and the emerging literature
on ICOs. Existing studies on ICOs model the choice between ICO and venture capital
funding (Catalini and Gans 2018; Chod and Lyandres 2018), investigate the need for
legislation of ICOs (Kaal 2018), the geography of ICOs (Huang, Meoli, and Vismara 2019),
the returns, liquidity and trading volume of exchange-traded ICOs (Howell, Niessner, and
Yermack 2018; Benedetti and Kostovetsky 2018; Lyandres, Palazzo, and Rabetti 2019), and
reasons for entrepreneurs to launch peer-to-peer platforms (Li and Mann 2018). We are
aware of several other (working) papers on the determinants of funding success of ICOs.
First, Adhami, Giudici, and Martinazzi (2018) investigate 253 ICOs from 2014 until
August 2017 of which 81 percent reached the minimum funding goal. They find that
ICOs are more likely to reach the funding goal in cases where their programming code is
(partially) available in an online GitHub repository (measured after the ICO), when the
company has presold tokens to early-stage investors and when tokens come with the
right to access services or in some cases to a share in the profits. Second, Fisch (2019)
examines 423 ICOs in 2016–2018. He finds that the dollar amount raised in the ICO is
positively impacted by technical white papers and good quality source code, where the
latter is measured by the number of GitHub defect fixes. Third, Amsden and Schweizer
(2019) look at a sample of 1,009 ICOs (573 of which have data on funding amounts) from
2015 until March 2018 and use the listing on CoinMarketCap as their main success
measure. They report that venture uncertainty is negatively correlated with success
while venture quality has a positive impact on ICO success.
We contribute to the recent literature on ICOs and complement previous findings
in four ways. First, we investigate a number of previously unexplored determinants
(most importantly, expert and profile ratings and planned ICO duration in days).
Second, we use a richer set of fundraising success measures that distinguish between
capped versus uncapped ICOs and take into account the softcap and hardcap fun-
draising goals. Also, we use a funding success measure that captures whether the ICO
is trading on an exchange recognized by CoinMarketCap, a tracking website for
exchange-traded cryptocurrencies. Adhami, Giudici, and Martinazzi (2018) only ana-
lyse whether the minimum funding goal has been reached and Fisch (2019) uses the
log of the amount raised as the dependent variable. Amsden and Schweizer (2019)
use token tradability on an exchange tracked by CoinMarketCap as their key measure
of success. Third, we make use of the largest slice of the ICO universe for which data
is available during our sample period. We use eleven ICO databases2 to obtain this
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data, as no single database covers the full ICO universe. One issue that all ICO studies
face is that many of the ICOs that end up being unsuccessful delete their data. These
ICOs are thus less likely to be included in the analysis. However, we only miss out on
a few unsuccessful ICOs. Our sample includes 630 out of the 682 ICOs listed on
ICObench, a respected rating website for ICOs, during our sample period. This allows
us to paint a more comprehensive picture of the determinants of ICO success during
this period. Fourth, we extend the existing papers on ICO funding success by adding
an analysis of ex-post success of ICOs for a period of almost two years at least, which
accounts for the most recent developments in the ICO market. This adds to the
findings of Amsden and Schweizer (2019) who examine a smaller sample of 134
ICOs that are tracked by CoinMarketCap using a dummy measure of ex-post ICO
success indicating one if the token price at 30, 180, or 360 days after the ICO is above
the original ICO price. We evaluate token performance during a time window of
nearly two years at the minimum and make use of five success measures to assess
the survivability of the projects.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 derives our hypotheses.We
describe our sample in Section 3. Section 4 presents our results. We conclude in Section 5.
2. Hypotheses development
Information asymmetry is one important barrier to the financing of early-stage ventures
(Chod and Lyandres 2018). At the time of the ICO, there are no compulsory or audited
disclosures and the project is mostly at the idea stage with the actual launch of the
product or service only expected within one to two years after the ICO (EY 2017).
Moreover, there is no or little regulation and investor protection. In theory, this context
would impair successful fundraising by blockchain technology startups.
The ex-ante information problem of hidden information or adverse selection (Akerlof
1970) cannot be addressed by high-quality ICOs simply stating that they are of the high-
quality type. Also, a low-quality ICO could (falsely) claim to be of the high-quality type and
therefore investors would ignore this “cheap talk”. Investors use several information sources
to assess the quality of the token sale such as GitHub, Twitter, Telegram/Slack/Discord,
Bitcoinwiki, Facebook, Bitcointalk, whitepapers, videos, and LinkedIn. We hypothesize that
voluntary disclosure acts as a quality signal. Project teams of high-quality projects are more
willing to disclose information whereas project teams of poor quality projects are less
willing to share information with potential investors, especially when they face penalties
if the disclosure proves to be fraudulent ex-post (e.g., see the theoretical model of Hughes
1986). These higher-quality projects are then also expected to perform better in the longer-
run. We hypothesize:
Hypothesis 1A: More extensive disclosure (i.e., a higher profile rating) has a positive influence
on fundraising success
Hypothesis 1B: More extensive disclosure (i.e., a higher profile rating) has a positive influence
on subsequent project success
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At the same time, projects might be hesitant to share technical proprietary informa-
tion in whitepapers or in a public GitHub repository with a wider circle of investors
because the product or service is still under development and intellectual property
rights by patents and/or trademarks are not (yet) in place. In addition, the technical
information in whitepapers seems difficult to comprehend by most investors in ICOs
(Samieifar and Baur 2020) and most investors do not have the time and expertise to
conduct due diligence of the project themselves. One solution to this problem is to
make use of ratings by experts. A respected rating website in the crypto-sphere,
consisting of experts who voluntarily review ICOs, is ICObench. To become an expert
one must show a thorough knowledge of cryptocurrencies and its underlying market
dynamics. Reviewers obtain no compensation.3 We expect that highly rated ICOs are
more likely to be successful in raising funds and in the period after the ICO. Therefore,
we hypothesise that:
Hypothesis 2A: Higher ratings by expert reviewers have a positive influence on fundraising
success
Hypothesis 2B: Higher ratings by expert reviewers have a positive influence on subsequent
project success
Another way to mitigate the adverse selection problem is signalling (Spence 1973).
In the case of signalling the project deliberately makes use of positive and observable
indicators of otherwise not directly observable qualities in an attempt to mitigate the
ex-ante information problem with investors (Spence 2002). In order to be effective,
a signal needs to be costly and correlate strongly with the quality it plans to indicate.
High-quality ICOs are better able to absorb the higher costs of signalling. Low-quality
projects will not imitate the signal of high-quality projects because they are not able
or willing to bear the high costs associated with the signal. The benefits of being
correctly identified as a high-quality ICO would outweigh the high costs only in case
the project is truly of the high-quality type. The decision to post the programming
code underlying the project on a software development platform and repository
GitHub can be seen as such a signal. It would allow experts to review the program-
ming code and information about the technical side of the project before the ICO and
collaborate on further improvements in the period after the ICO. Only companies that
are confident about the technical side of their project would subject it to expert
scrutiny on GitHub before the ICO. These companies are expected to be more
successful in raising funds as well as showing superior long-term performance after-
wards. We hypothesize:
Hypothesis 3A: Posting programming code or technical information on software repository
GitHub before the ICO has a positive influence on fundraising success
Hypothesis 3B: Posting programming code or technical information on software repository
GitHub before the ICO has a positive impact on subsequent project success
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The distribution of tokens to insiders may be another important signal to investors. In
ICOs, the percentage of tokens owned by the insiders after the ICO is known at the time
of the ICO. These exchange-traded tokens can be sold in the future at a higher price in
case the project is successful and needs to raise fresh capital. This signals that project
developers are confident about the future success of the project and refrain from raising
as much capital as possible from investors at the time of the ICO. The percentage of
tokens held by insiders may also mitigate a potential ex-post information or moral
hazard problem. If insiders continue to own a significant percentage of the tokens they
have a strong incentive to work hard towards a successful launch the blockchain
project.
Hypothesis 4A: A higher percentage of tokens retained by insiders positively impacts fundrais-
ing success
Hypothesis 4B: A higher percentage of tokens retained by insiders positively impacts subse-
quent project success
An ICO can take place in multiple stages, i.e. a pre-ICO can be launched to test market
demand and estimate a price for the token. Before opening the ICO to the public, early-
bird investors are typically able to obtain bonuses (e.g. deep discounts for early
investors without lockups or vesting periods) to encourage early participation and to
generate momentum. Typically there is a higher minimum investment amount com-
pared to the public sale that follows afterwards. The ICO presale tends to be smaller
than the public sale of the ICO and is intended to show to the public that the project
team was able to have a pool of (befriended) cornerstone investors willing to invest in
the project already.
Hypothesis 5: ICOs preceded by a presale are more likely to successfully raise funds in the
public phase of the ICO
The public ICO sale follows suit, is open for everyone to invest in, and often has a lower
minimum investment amount compared to the presale. Early investors in public token
sales can also qualify for bonuses and price discounts albeit lower compared to the
presale. This creates an incentive for investors to invest as soon as possible out of fear
of missing out. However, having to make use of bonus schemes in the public phase of the
ICO may also signal that the project team is struggling to attract sufficient interest in the
presale (if organized) or in the ICO itself and that, despite the bullish market for ICOs in our
sample period, it needs to resort to bonuses and price discounts to attract public
investors. Moreover, potential investors may be afraid that too many bonus participants
can engage in flipping and sell the tokens at a profit (at ICO price) once the tokens launch
on a secondary market, driving the price down. We hypothesize that the use of bonus
schemes in the public part of the ICO has a negative effect:
Hypothesis 6: The use of bonus schemes in the public phase of the ICO negatively impacts
fundraising success
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At the launch of the ICO, the project team announces the number of days the
campaign will accept funding. In the context of reward-based crowdfunding, Mollick
(2014) reports that campaigns with a longer duration have a lower probability of reaching
their funding goals. Planning on a longer duration may signal a lack of confidence in the
project to potential investors (Mollick 2014). We, therefore, hypothesize that a longer
planned duration of the ICO campaign at the time of its launch negatively impacts
fundraising success.
Hypothesis 7: Longer planned campaign durations have a negative influence on fundraising
success
Investors may appreciate larger project teams, as it may show that a larger number of
people are willing to work on bringing the project to fruition, speeding up the time to the
actual launch of the blockchain project. Ahlers, Cumming, Gunther and Schweizer (2015)
show that human capital (proxied by the number of board members) is positively related
to funding success on one of the first crowdinvestment platforms, the Australian Small
Scale Offerings Board. In addition, a larger project team implies a larger network of
contacts it can mobilize to promote the ICO and assist in the project´s future development
in the post-ICO period. We hypothesize:
Hypothesis 8A: Having a larger project team positively impacts fundraising success
Hypothesis 8B: Having a larger project team positively impacts subsequent project success
3. Data and methods
We start with an initial dataset consisting of 682 ICOs from ICObench and other sources
during the period August 2015 until December 2017.4 We stop in December 2017 in order
to measure success as survival for a period of nearly two years or longer. Because
information is widely dispersed on the Internet and most databases often include only
partial information, we identify these ICOs from eleven databases.5 Out of the available
databases, ICObench provides the most thorough and highest quality information on ICO
campaigns and therefore serves as the core of our sample. By using the Application
Programming Interface (API), it is possible to draw information from the database directly.
Even though we consider ICObench the most comprehensive database, it still lacks key
information which we manually supplemented with data from other databases, websites,
forum threads and whitepapers.
For 52 out of 682 ICOs, it is not possible to find relevant information on the Internet,
because websites, forum posts and Twitter accounts have been deleted or the crowdsale
never took place. In cases where insufficient data is available online, we exclude the ICO
from the dataset. In a handful of cases where we could not obtain the amounts of capital
raised directly from ICObench or other sources, we have analysed the transactions on the
blockchain during the ICO period to calculate the funding amount ourselves.6 This
resulted in a sample consisting of 630 ICOs.
In our analyses we use four measures of funding success as our dependent variables,
reflecting the different ways in which ICOs are structured. Table 1 shows the variable
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definitions. Table 2 provides an overview of the ICO distribution (country of origin, project
category and blockchain used) in our sample. Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics.
We measure funding success with a dummy variable indicating whether the softcap (i.e.
the minimum funding goal) has been reached, the amount of capital raised as
a percentage of the hardcap (i.e. the maximum funding goal), the log of the amount of
capital raised, and a dummy variable indicating whether the ICO was admitted to trading
on an online exchange that is tracked by CoinMarketCap. Table 3 shows that 185 ICOs
make use of a softcap (29% of the sample). The softcap averages 4.96 USD million and 85
ICOs with softcaps (46% of the sample with softcaps) manage to raise more capital than
the minimum target amount. Our sample contains 575 capped ICOs (91.3% of the sample)
and 55 uncapped ICOs (8.7% of the sample). The average hardcap is set at 56.5
USD million for the capped ICOs. On average, a capped ICO raises 34% of its hardcap.
The average amount of capital raised amounts to 9.55 USD million with a minimum of
zero and a maximum of 258 USD million. Cryptocurrencies frequently accepted as pay-
ment are Ethereum (in 533 ICOs, 85% of the sample), followed by Bitcoin (in 184 ICOs, 29%
of the sample). Fiat currency is only accepted in 41 ICOs (6.5% of the sample). In our
sample 163 ICOs accept multiple currencies as a means of payment for the tokens (26% of
the sample). Half of the ICOs in our sample are admitted to trading on an online exchange
tracked by CoinMarketCap.
We also use five dependent variables to measure the success of the project afterwards.
We look at whether the website of the project is still online in November 2019, the Tweets
from the project team per week in the period between the start of the ICO and
November 2019, whether there have been any Tweets by the project team in the period
September until November 2019, whether there have been any contributions on software
repository GitHub during that same period and whether the ICO ended up on the
Table 2. Sample distribution.
Country Category Blockchain
Count % Count % Count %
USA 121 19.2 Platform 166 26.3 Ethereum 533 84.6
Russia 85 13.5 Currency 100 15.8 Waves 39 6.2
UK 47 7.4 Business services 66 10.5 BitShares 5 0.8
Singapore 42 6.7 Entertainment 45 7.1 NEO 4 0.6
Switzerland 27 4.3 Investment 31 4.9 NEM 3 0.5
Canada 17 2.7 Software 31 4.9 Omni 3 0.5
Estonia 14 2.2 Banking 28 4.4 Counterparty 2 0.3
Australia 13 2.1 Casino & gambling 18 2.9 Litecoin 2 0.3
Germany 11 1.7 Internet 15 2.4 NXT 2 0.3
Hong Kong 11 1.7 Real estate 15 2.4 Ardor 1 0.2
Israel 11 1.7 Other 14 2.2 Electroneum 1 0.2
Netherlands 11 1.7 Media 11 1.7 Expanse 1 0.2
Slovenia 11 1.7 Health 9 1.4 Filecoin Network 1 0.2
China 8 1.3 Tourism 9 1.4 Maidsafe 1 0.2
Lithuania 8 1.3 Infrastructure 8 1.3 NEBL 1 0.2
France 7 1.1 Sports 8 1.3 Own 1 0.2
Japan 7 1.1 Communication 7 1.1 QRC 1 0.2
Spain 7 1.1 Education 7 1.1 Tendermint 1 0.2
Unknown 60 9.5 Retail 7 1.1 Unknown 26 4.1
Other 112 17.9 Other 35 5.7 Other 2 0.3
Total 630 Total 630 Total 630
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graveyard (i.e. is trading below 10% of its original ICO price or is no longer tracked on
CoinMarketCap in November 2019).7 For the ex-post analysis, we only investigate 472
ICOs that successfully raised more than 50,000 USD during their campaign to ensure that
our results are not driven by ICOs that have been unsuccessful at raising funds. This 50,000
USD threshold corresponds with the 25th percentile of the distribution of the funding
amount raised in our sample of 630 ICOs. In other words, we have removed the bottom
quartile of projects with the lowest amount of money raised from our ex-post analysis.
About 80% of the project websites are still online in November 2019. The average
(median) Tweet activity of the project team equals 8.9 (5.6) Tweets per week during the
period between the end of the ICO and November 2019. There are 51% of projects with
Twitter accounts that have recent Tweets in the period September-November 2019, and
46% projects with GitHub repositories at any point in time show recent activity on GitHub
in that same period. A majority of ICOs that are initially tracked by CoinMarketCap (59%)
ends up on the graveyard (e.g. trading at a price below 10% of the original ICO price or no
longer being tracked by CoinMarketCap).
Our independent variables include the expert ratings and profile ratings on rating
website ICObench, a dummy variable indicating whether the project created a GitHub
repository before the ICO (retrieved via a Chrome extension), the percentage of tokens
Table 3. Descriptive statistics.
Variable Obs. Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max
Dependent variables:
Funding success:
Softcap hit (dummy) 185 0.46 0 0.5 0 1
Funding percentage (%) 575 34.24 14.14 39 0 100
Funding raised ($ million) 630 9.55 1.98 23.8 0 258
Token tradability (dummy) 630 0.5 1 0.5 0 1
Ex-post success:
Website online (dummy) 472 0.79 1 0.41 0 1
Tweets per week (#) 429 8.91 5.61 12.16 0 119
Twitter activity (dummy) 429 0.51 1 0.50 0 1
GitHub activity (dummy) 309 0.46 0 0.50 0 1
Graveyard (dummy) 312 0.59 1 0.49 0 1
Independent variables:
Quality rating (from 1–5) 311 3.39 3.47 0.93 1 5
Profile rating (from 0–5) 630 3.03 3 1.03 0.6 5
GitHub_preICO (dummy) 630 0.40 0 0.49 0 1
Insider token retention (%) 630 41.51 40 25.01 0 99
Presale (dummy) 630 0.38 0 0.49 0 1
Bonus scheme (dummy) 630 0.4 0 0.49 0 1
Duration (# days) 630 28.96 30 17.77 1 134
Team members (#) 630 9.58 8 7.54 1 57
Control variables:
Softcap ($ million) 185 4.96 2 7.93 0.3 51
Hardcap ($ million) 575 56.53 20 347 0.02 7801
Uncapped ICO (dummy) 630 0.09 0 0.283 0 1
Accepted currencies (#) 630 1.59 1 1.36 1 13
Fiat currency (dummy) 630 0.07 0 0.25 0 1
Ethereum platform (dummy) 630 0.85 1 0.36 0 1
Token price ($ cents) 630 1,788.59 25.91 30,480.48 0.01 755,460
Total tokens (in millions) 630 20,229 100 337,554 0.01 8,000,000
Ethereum return (%) 630 24.32 6.41 51.96 −56.37 308.81
Ethereum volatility (%) 630 3.93 3.39 1.61 0 8.49
ICO volume (#) 630 89.35 102 40.86 1 140
Note: See Table 1 for data definitions.
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retained by insiders, a dummy variable whether a presale takes place before the public
phase of the ICO, a dummy variable indicating whether a bonus scheme is used in the
public token sale, the planned duration of the ICO in days and the number of project team
members. Table 3 documents that the average (median) expert rating on ICObench
equals 3.39 (3.47). The highest possible rating is five, corresponding to high-quality
ICOs, whereas the lowest possible score is one, implying a weak investment opportunity.
The expert rating consists of three elements: team, vision and product, and is available for
311 observations. The expert rating is based on the review of an average of 2.7 crypto-
currency experts. The profile rating is available for all ICOs in the dataset and yields an
average (median) of 3.03 (3). This rating is based on a computer algorithm and reflects the
disclosure on ICObench for 31 distinct elements, such as the presence of GitHub, Twitter,
and Facebook (for an extensive description consult Table 1). There are 253 projects with
GitHub software repositories at the time of the ICO (40% of the sample). Insiders retain an
average (median) of 42% (40%) of tokens. Presales happen in 241 cases (38.3% of the
sample) and bonus schemes such as price discounts and free tokens are used in the public
part of the ICO in 252 ICOs (40% of the sample). Table 3 shows that the average (median)
duration of the ICO campaign is planned to be 29 days (30 days). The average (median)
project team consists of 9.6 (8) members.
We include several control variables in our regressions. As there is no regulation
concerning ICO structure, there are numerous possibilities for project developers in the
design of the campaign that we need to control for. For example, the project developers
can opt for a capped versus uncapped sale, make use of minimum fundraising goals
(softcaps) and/or maximum fundraising goals (hardcaps) and accept payment in fiat
currency and/or (multiple) digital currencies. The initial value and supply of the tokens
are entirely at the discretion of the project developers, and often arbitrarily determined. In
regressions using the funding percentage as the dependent variable, we control for the
log of the hardcap (i.e., the maximum funding goal). In regressions using the other
measures of funding success as dependent variables, we control for a dummy that
indicates whether the ICO was uncapped or not. In uncapped ICOs, the investors are
uncertain about howmany tokens will be sold or about the cryptocurrency valuation. This
could signal opportunistic behaviour or even greed on the part of the project developers
as they sell as many tokens as investors want to buy (Buterin 2017). In contrast, in capped
ICOs the maximum amount of funding is fixed. There are 55 uncapped ICOs (8.7% of the
sample). When using the softcap hit as the dependent variable, we control for the log of
the softcap (i.e. the minimum funding goal).
In addition, we control for the token price (excluding any bonuses and price discounts)
and the log of the number of tokens created (i.e. the total of tokens that are sold and held
by insiders). Investors might be more interested in tokens with lower prices and lower
supply because they anticipate more upward potential for these lower-priced and scarce
tokens. The average token price equals 17.9 USD but the median token price equals only
26 dollar cents. The average (median) number of tokens created amounts to more than
20 billion (100 million). The large difference between average andmedian values indicates
the presence of outliers. Therefore, we log transform the variables token price and token
supply. Furthermore, we include the number of accepted currencies for payment,
a dummy variable indicating if paying with fiat currency was possible and a dummy
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variable related to whether the project is (partly) based on the Ethereum platform as
control variables in our models.
Finally, we also control for market conditions. We include three additional control
variables: (1) Ethereum return during a 30-day window preceding the ICO launch, (2)
Ethereum volatility measured as the standard deviation of the daily return on Ethereum
during a 30-day window preceding the ICO launch and (3) the number of ICOs during the
month in which the ICO launch took place.
In the next section, we report our regression results. In the case of binary depen-
dent variables, we make use of logistic regressions; in all other cases OLS regressions
are used. In all tables, we report on the average and maximum Variance Inflation
Factors (VIFs). None of our regression specifications has an average VIF exceeding
three and only a handful has the maximum VIF slightly exceeding three. This is well
below the threshold of ten that is commonly used to identify severe multicollinearity
problems. We, therefore, conclude that multicollinearity is not a primary concern in
our analysis.
4. Results
4.1. Determinants of funding success
In this section, we examine the determinants of funding success. We start with
a univariate analysis presented in Table 4. Panel A shows the funding success measures
split by the profile rating categories (ranging from 0 to 5). Panel B displays these success
measures split by expert rating categories (ranging from 1 to 5). A clear pattern emerges
showing that both higher profile and expert ratings are associated with more funding
success. Table 4 also shows the difference in means between ICOs with a profile or expert
rating above the median or below the median. ICOs with an above-median profile and
expert rating are significantly more successful in reaching the softcap and raise more
capital (both expressed as a percentage of the hardcap as well as the dollar amount)
compared to ICOs with below-median profile or expert ratings. ICOs with an above-
median profile and expert ratings are also more likely to have their tokens listed on
CoinMarketCap than ICOs with a below-median score on these ratings.
Next, we conduct multivariate regression analyses that include our control variables (as
defined in Table 1). Table 5 shows that the profile and expert rating have a positive and
highly significant impact on funding success, both when run separately (Panels A and B)
and jointly in a regression (Panel C). The only two exceptions relate to the expert rating
which is no longer significantly associated with the probability of reaching the softcap
target amount and the probability of having the tokens listed on CoinMarketCap in Panel
C of Table 5. The effects are both statistically and economically important: for example, in
the second column of Table 5, we find that a one-point increase in the profile or the expert
rating will increase the funding percentage by more than ten percentage points. Table 5
does not show the coefficients of the control variables to conserve space.
In line with our hypotheses 1A and 2A, our results show that both profile and expert
ratings are statistically and economically important determinants of funding success.
These ratings serve as aggregated measures of the profile and quality of ICOs and each
is an important determinant in its own right.
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Next, we investigate several determinants that, based on theory, we expect to impact
funding (see Section 3). It is important to note that in our multivariate analyses we do not
include the ratings. The reason is that some of the success determinants we look at are also
components of the ratings (also see our variable description in Table 1). For example, the
availability of a pre-ICOGitHub repository, albeit small (weight equals 6 percent), is also part of
the profile rating. The first column of Table 6 shows that having a presale, and a higher
number of team members positively impact the probability of hitting the softcap target
amount. Funding as a percentage of the hardcap target amount, the amount of funding and
the probability of getting the token traded on an online exchange tracked by CoinMarketCap
are all positively impacted by having one or more GitHub repositories before the ICO, having
a presale, and having more members on the project team. These findings are in line with our
hypotheses 3A, 5, and 8A. Not having a bonus scheme in the public phase of the ICO and
having a shorter planned duration of the campaign are positively related to funding
Table 5. Determinants of funding success: Profile and expert ratings.
Variable Softcap hit Funding percentage
Ln(1+
Funding raised) Token tradability
Panel A
Profile rating (from 0–5) 0.407
(6.54)***
0.153
(11.50)***
2.758
(14.98)***
0.298
(9.57)***
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 185 575 630 630
F-Value 35.72*** 33.58***
Wald Chi2 56.44*** 131.73***
(pseudo or adjusted) R-Squared 0.373 0.313 0.337 0.328
Average VIF 1.43 1.66 1.30 1.30
Maximum VIF 2.19 3.23 1.77 1.77
Panel B
Expert rating (from 1–5) 0.206
(2.25)**
0.136
(5.88)***
2.487
(6.80)***
0.153
(4.01)***
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 97 290 311 311
F-Value 17.99*** 11.93***
Wald Chi2 26.40*** 47.34***
(pseudo or adjusted) R-Squared 0.257 0.309 0.247 0.220
Average VIF 1.90 1.73 1.38 1.38
Maximum VIF 2.93 3.04 1.78 1.78
Panel C
Profile rating (from 0–5) 0.783
(4.85)***
0.146
(7.58)***
2.757
(9.60)***
0.268
(5.93)***
Expert rating (from 1–5) −0.193
(−1.16)
0.083
(3.51)***
1.327
(4.33)***
0.050
(1.17)
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 97 290 311 311
F-Value 29.79*** 19.82***
Wald Chi2 34.07*** 73.28***
(pseudo or adjusted) R-Squared 0.564 0.416 0.453 0.342
Average VIF 1.98 1.72 1.40 1.40
Maximum VIF 2.93 3.06 1.78 1.78
Note: See Table 1 for variable definitions. The first and fourth column report average marginal effects from logistic
regressions with z-statistics using robust standard errors in parentheses. The second and third column report OLS
regression coefficients with t-statistics using robust standard errors in parentheses. * = significant at the 10% level,
** = significant at the 5% level, *** = significant at the 1% level. All regressions include a constant and the following
control variables: Accepted currencies, Fiat currency, Ethereum platform, Ln(1+ Token price), Ln(1+ Total tokens),
Ethereum return, Ethereum volatility, Ln(ICO volume). Uncapped ICO is included as a control in regressions using the
Softcap hit, Ln(1+ Funding raised) and Token tradability as dependent variables. Ln(Softcap) is used as control variable
in the regression using Softcap hit as the dependent variable and Ln(Hardcap) is used as a control variable in the
regression using Funding percentage as the dependent variable.
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percentage and the probability that the token is tracked by CoinMarketCap. This is consistent
with hypotheses 6 and 7. However, in contrast with our hypothesis 4A, insider token retention
is insignificant in all regressions. Considering the control variables, we observe that setting
a higher target amount for the softcap reduces the probability of reaching that target and
setting a higher target amount for the hardcap negatively impacts funds raised as
a percentage of that hardcap. These findings are in line with Mollick (2014) who finds similar
results in the context of reward-based crowdfunding. In some model specifications, we also
find the fiat currency dummy, the Ethereum dummy, the total token supply and the market
condition variables to be significant. In the next subsection, we examine the determinants of
subsequent project success.
4.2. Determinants of ex-post success
This section focuses on the determinants of ex-post ICO success. We limit our ex-post
analysis to 472 ICOs that were successful in raising at least 50,000 USD. The threshold of
50,000 USD corresponds with the 25th percentile of the distribution of the amount of
funding raised in our sample of 630 ICOs. This removes the projects that failed to raise any
money (e.g. because they were not able to reach the softcap target) from our analysis and
ensures that the ex-post results are not driven by comparing projects that successfully
raised money with those projects that did not.
Table 7 shows the univariate results for the profile and expert ratings split per rating
score. It shows that the performance of ICOs with above-median ratings is superior
compared to below-median rated token sales. We find that ICOs with an above-median
profile rating have a significantly higher likelihood of their website being online in
November 2019 and are more likely to have post-ICO Twitter and GitHub activity in the
period between September and November 2019. The number of Tweets per week in the
period from the start of the ICO until November 2019 is significantly higher for ICOs with
above-median profile ratings compared to the ICOs with below-median scores. For expert
ratings, we find that ICOs with above-median expert ratings show higher Twitter and
GitHub activity in the post-ICO period and are less likely to end up on the graveyard.
Table 8 shows the effect of the profile and expert ratings on ex-post success measures
using multivariate regressions that include the control variables (as defined in Table 1).
Similar to Table 5, we do not show the coefficients of the control variables to conserve
space. We find that both types of ratings are relevant and have a positive and significant
impact on how well the project performs in the post-ICO period. The only exception is
when using the graveyard dummy as the dependent variable (last column) in which case
the coefficient of the profile rating is not significant. In addition, the profile rating loses its
significance in the regressions using Tweets per week and GitHub activity as dependent
variables when combined with expert ratings in the same regression (Panel C). We
conclude that our results provide support for hypothesis 1B (depending on the ex-post
success measure used) and strong support for hypothesis 2B.
Table 9 shows the more specific determinants that we hypothesized to impact
longer-run project success. There is some support for Hypotheses 3B, 4B and 8B. Pre-
ICO GitHub repositories are positively associated with the probability of having the
project’s website online in November 2019 and lower the probability of the token
trading at a price below 10% of the issue price or the token no longer being traded
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on an exchange tracked by CoinMarketCap. Token retention by the project team is
positively related to the number of Tweets per week in the period from the ICO start
until November 2019. The number of members of the project team positively relates to
the probability of having an online website in November 2019, the number of Tweets
per week in the post-ICO period and the probability of recent Twitter activity in the
period September-November 2019.
Although we did not develop specific hypotheses concerning the ex-post performance
for the other dependent variables, we do find that ICO campaigns that have been open for
funding for a shorter period generate more Tweets in the period from the start of the ICO
until November 2019 and are more likely to still be active on Twitter and GitHub in the
period of September until November 2019. ICOs with a bonus scheme in the public phase
of the selling process are associated with a lower probability of having an accessible
website still. Several of the control variables (price, total token supply, and ICO volume)
are significant in some model specifications.
Table 8. Determinants of ex-post ICO success: Profile and expert ratings.
Variable Website online Tweets per week Twitter activity GitHub activity Graveyard
Panel A
Profile rating (from 0–5) 0.100
(4.91)***
1.859
(2.55)**
0.164
(5.24)***
0.096
(2.65)***
−0.055
(−1.50)
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 472 429 429 309 312
F-Value 4.44***
Wald Chi2 34.56*** 52.36*** 29.94*** 33.88***
(pseudo or adjusted) R-Squared 0.079 0.035 0.105 0.069 0.088
Average VIF 1.35 1.34 1.34 1.31 1.35
Maximum VIF 1.81 1.80 1.80 1.71 1.75
Panel B
Expert rating (from 1–5) 0.061
(1.91)*
1.911
(2.05)**
0.131
(2.99)***
0.187
(3.25)***
−0.180
(−2.87)***
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 254 240 240 175 179
F-Value 1.96**
Wald Chi2 19.04** 29.10*** 22.01*** 24.31***
(pseudo or adjusted) R-Squared 0.068 0.038 0.101 0.112 0.155
Average VIF 1.45 1.44 1.44 1.42 1.43
Maximum VIF 1.99 1.92 1.92 1.94 1.95
Panel C
Profile rating (from 0–5) 0.105
(4.19)***
1.386
(1.39)
0.176
(3.78)***
0.086
(1.50)
−0.062
(−1.12)
Expert rating (from 1–5) 0.035
(1.25)
1.679
(1.80)*
0.108
(2.47)**
0.180
(3.04)***
−0.177
(−2.84)***
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 254 240 240 175 179
F-Value 2.09**
Wald Chi2 30.95*** 45.40*** 27.19*** 27.03***
(pseudo or adjusted) R-Squared 0.136 0.043 0.148 0.123 0.161
Average VIF 1.44 1.43 1.43 1.42 1.45
Maximum VIF 1.99 1.92 1.92 1.94 1.96
Note: See Table 1 for variable definitions. The first, third, fourth and fifth column report average marginal effects from
logistic regressions with z-statistics using robust standard errors in parentheses. The second column reports OLS
regression coefficients with t-statistics using robust standard errors in parentheses. Only ICOs that successfully raised
more than $50 k are taken into account. All regressions include a constant and the following control variables:
Uncapped ICO, Accepted currencies, Fiat currency, Ethereum platform, Ln(1+ Token price), Ln(1+ Total tokens),
Ethereum return, Ethereum volatility, Ln(ICO volume). * = significant at the 10% level, ** = significant at the 5%
level, *** = significant at the 1% level.
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We have conducted several additional analyses (unreported). We included dummies
for the countries and categories listed in Table 2 in all our regressions. Our results are
robust to the inclusion of these dummies. In all regressions, we replaced the three control
variables capturing market conditions (Ethereum return, Ethereum volatility, and ICO
volume) with a set of calendar month dummies. Our results are robust when time
dummies are included. We also tested the robustness of the cut-off point to identify
ICOs that have been successful in raising funds, for example, increasing the lower bound
of funding success from 50,000 USD to 2 million USD. We rerun the regressions using the
five ex-post success measures as dependent variables for the sample of 282 ICOs that
raised more than 2 USD million (the median funding raised in our overall sample). Again,
our results are not materially affected by the adjustment of the specification.
Table 9. Determinants of ex-post ICO success.
Variable Website online Tweets per week Twitter activity GitHub activity Graveyard
Independent variables
GitHub_preICO (dummy) 0.137
(3.89)***
−0.481
(−0.38)
0.074
(1.38)
−0.008
(−0.12)
−0.120
(−1.91)*
Insider token retention (%) 0.001
(0.02)
7.444
(2.34)**
0.131
(1.08)
0.179
(1.23)
−0.056
(−0.41)
Presale (dummy) 0.017
(0.43)
1.949
(1.31)
−0.037
(0.64)
−0.041
(−0.60)
−0.020
(−0.29)
Bonus scheme (dummy) −0.089
(−2.17)**
−1.749
(−1.46)
−0.091
(−1.59)
−0.072
(−1.04)
0.066
(0.94)
Duration (# days) −0.001
(−0.52)
−0.046
(−1.73)*
−0.003
(−1.96)**
−0.006
(−2.66)***
0.002
(1.08)
Team members (#) 0.007
(2.37)**
0.169
(1.70)*
0.014
(3.72)***
0.005
(1.25)
−0.004
(−1.03)
Control variables
Uncapped ICO (dummy) 0.012
(0.20)
0.168
(0.10)
0.046
(0.51)
0.030
(0.26)
−0.101
(−0.93)
Accepted currencies (#) 0.002
(0.16)
0.568
(1.21)
0.035
(1.77)*
−0.030
(−1.09)
−0.013
(−0.50)
Fiat currency (dummy) −0.027
(−0.33)
3.206
(1.11)
−0.131
(−1.28)
0.055
(0.36)
0.090
(0.62)
Ethereum platform (dummy) −0.011
(−0.19)
2.340
(1.53)
−0.011
(−0.14)
−0.051
(−0.48)
−0.038
(−0.41)
Ln(1+ Token price) 0.017
(1.16)
−0.006
(−0.01)
−0.002
(−0.13)
0.027
(1.25)
0.055
(2.30)**
Ln(1+ Total tokens) 0.026
(1.82)*
0.317
(1.00)
0.016
(0.93)
0.051
(2.65)***
−0.023
(−1.11)
Ethereum return (%) −0.041
(−1.17)
−0.164
(−0.17)
−0.017
(−0.32)
0.006
(0.11)
−0.022
(−0.40)
Ethereum volatility (%) 0.838
(0.74)
43.709
(1.19)
2.706
(1.59)
0.614
(0.31)
1.183
(0.59)
Ln(ICO volume) (#) −0.046
(−1.84)*
−1.738
(−1.93)*
−0.128
(−3.27)***
−0.046
(−1.07)
0.128
(3.49)***
Observations 472 429 429 309 312
F-Value 3.04***
Wald Chi2 40.89*** 48.91*** 34.09*** 39.67***
(pseudo or adjusted) R-Squared 0.089 0.052 0.100 0.086 0.103
Average VIF 1.33 1.33 1.33 1.32 1.33
Maximum VIF 2.14 2.14 2.14 2.02 2.10
Note: See Table 1 for variable definitions. The first, third, fourth and fifth column report average marginal effects from
logistic regressions with z-statistics using robust standard errors in parentheses. The second column reports OLS
regression coefficients with t-statistics using robust standard errors in parentheses. Only ICOs that successfully raised
more than $50 k are taken into account. All regressions include a constant. * = significant at the 10% level,
** = significant at the 5% level, *** = significant at the 1% level.
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5. Conclusions
Initial Coin Offerings (ICOs) have become an increasingly popular way for entrepreneurs
to raise money for early-stage blockchain projects until 2017, with stabilising demand in
the first half of 2018 and a collapse in the second half of 2018. ICOs are fraught with
asymmetric information problems between the project team and potential investors that
are considering buying the tokens. This paper is the first to test whether ratings from
rating websites such as ICObench can help to bridge this information gap. We find that
projects that disclose more extensive information to investors (i.e. have a higher profile
rating) are more successful in fundraising, and experience more post-ICO project success.
In addition, a higher rating by cryptocurrency experts on the quality of the project and
project team is associated with more success in fundraising and better ex-post perfor-
mance. These results contribute to the existing ICO literature and underline the impor-
tance of profile and expert ratings using a rich set of funding and ex-post success
measures.
Our results further show that having one or more pre-ICO GitHub repository, a presale,
not making use of bonus schemes in the public phase of the ICO, a shorter planned
duration of the ICO campaign, and a larger project team are positively related to funding
success. Depending on model specification, we also find that having at least one GitHub
repository before the start of the ICO, a shorter planned period during which tokens are
sold, and a larger number of project team members positively impact ex-post project
performance. These results are in line with the results of other (working) papers on ICOs
(e.g. Fisch (2019), Amsden and Schweizer (2019), Lyandres, Palazzo, and Rabetti (2019),
and Adhami, Giudici, and Martinazzi (2018)).
We conclude that for entrepreneurs it is important to make the ICO as transparent as
possible and that for investors, expert ratings are a useful way in which to overcome the
information asymmetry problems associated with token sales. Project teams that provide
more and useful information to investors are more likely to successfully raise money from
investors and show superior performance afterwards.
Our research demonstrates that in the ICO setting economic theory provides mean-
ingful determinants of success, including disclosure and ratings that can reduce the
information gap. We also demonstrate that many elements that are specific to ICOs
have strong effects on the success in raising funding and sustaining the business.
Although our study presents tests of hypotheses and detailed information on the ICOs,
future research will be needed to build theory specifically for ICOs, as well as to assess the
longer-term viability of ICO-funded projects.
Notes
1. CoinMarketCap checks projects that apply for admission on its platform rigorously before
listing them. In order for a cryptocurrency to be considered for listing on CoinMarketCap it
must have a functional website and block explorer, and be listed on a publicly available
exchange with trading volume. Beyond these criteria, CoinMarketCap closely monitors both
qualitative and quantitative factors. See: https://support.coinmarketcap.com/hc/en-us/arti
cles/360034124351-Listings-Criteria.
2. Databases accessed: www.tokendata.io, www.icotracker.net, www.cryptocompare.com/ico,
www.smithandcrown.com/icos, https://elementus.io/token-sales-history, www.icomarket
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data.com, www.icodata.io, www.coindesk.com/ico-tracker/, www.icobench.com/ico, www.
coinschedule.com, www.ico-list.com, www.icostats.com.
3. See https://medium.com/@ICObench/icobench-experts-the-importance-of-being-just-
bbe07e00f73e.
4. See: https://icobench.com/stats.
5. Databases accessed: See footnote 2 for a list of databases.
6. Using the following websites: www.etherscan.io, https://wavesexplorer.com, https://blockex
plorer.com/.
7. Reasons for delisting from CoinMarketCap include: low liquidity or suspicious trading activity,
the project’s cessation of development and/or business activity, the project’s listing on
CoinMarketCap was the result of misleading, incomplete, or false information, the project
(and/or its associates) is under investigation, on regulator watchlists, or is found guilty of
a breach of law(s), statute(s), and regulation(s), extraordinarily poor implementation or recep-
tion by the project’s community or any other factor that CoinMarketCap deems risky for its users
(source: https://support.coinmarketcap.com/hc/en-us/articles/360034124351-Listings-Criteria).
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